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Re view Ar ti cle: De lib era tive De moc racy 
and Be yond
Rea son, Ago nism and Rheto ric
CAMIL-ALEXANDRU PÂRVU
The aim of this ar ti cle is less to pro vide an ex haus tive list of the main re cent 
con tri bu tions to the lit era ture on de lib era tive de moc racy, as rather to de scribe and 
as sess a ge neric theo reti cal struc ture of de lib era tive de moc ratic ac counts, as well 
as of some of the main criti cisms mounted against it. Since the num ber of such ac-
counts is grow ing at a fast pace, the task of enu mer at ing the lat est con tri bu tions 
would in evi ta bly pro duce a de scrip tion that would be not only too large but also 
quickly ob so lete. A set of core ele ments that theo ries of de lib era tive de moc racy1 
gen er ally share can how ever be iden ti fied, along with a cer tain domi nant ar gu-
men ta tive struc ture. More over, the criti cisms dis cussed in the sec ond part of this 
es say usu ally re fer less to par ticu lar in di vid ual con tri bu tions, but rather to such 
shared pre sup po si tions and to the main theo reti cal state ments com monly made 
by de lib era tive de moc rats.
This does not en tail that I ig nore the in ter nal di ver sity and plu ral ism of ap-
proaches among de lib era tive de moc rats2. Yet for the pur poses of this ar ti cle, my 
aim is to of fer an ac count not as much of this di ver sity, but rather of the sig nifi-
cance of de lib era tion and of its pub lic char ac ter in con tem po rary dis cus sions of de-
moc racy. I com pare and as sess theo ries of de lib era tive de moc racy in or der to 
bet ter un der stand where they are situ ated in the lar ger field cov ered by nor ma tive 
po liti cal the ory.
Fur ther more, since my main con cern in this es say re lates to the main theo reti-
cal nor ma tive de bates, I will not ad dress the in creas ingly vast and com plex em-
piri cal lit era ture on how to op era tion al ize the de lib era tive stan dards3. Be sides 
the im por tance of em piri cal tests and their po ten tial for de ter min ing con cep tual 
change, the em piri cal lit era ture is it self an im por tant re source for the work of 
clari fy ing and un der stand ing the con tro ver sies sur round ing the nor ma tive ana-
lyti cal state ments. Yet the nor ma tive and the em piri cal di rec tions of re search in 
de lib era tive de moc racy are still mostly dis tinct, and the fo cus of this ar ti cle is con-
sti tuted by the for mer.
In the first part of this es say, I will dis cuss some of the main ele ments of pub-
lic de lib era tory ac counts. The key theo reti cal state ments in this field point to a set 
1 James BOHMAN, William REHG (eds.), Deliberative Democracy. Essays on Reason and 
Politics, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997.
2 James S FISHKIN, Peter LASLETT (eds.), Debating Deliberative Democracy (Philosophy, 
Politics and Society 7), Blackwell, Oxford, 2003.
3 Jürg STEINER, André BÄCHTIGER, Markus SPORNDLI, Marco STEENBERGEN, Delibe-
rative Politics in Action. Analysing Parliamentary Discourse, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2004; David M. RYFE, ”Does Deliberative Democracy Work?”, Annual Review of Political Science, 
vol. 8, 2005, pp. 49-71.
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of prin ci ples and nor ma tive as sump tions; I will sys tema tize and con trast these 
with the al ter na tive ”ag gre ga tive” vi sions of de moc racy, as they are pre sented in 
the lit era ture. What is de lib era tive de moc racy, why should we take it so se ri ously, 
when should we en gage in pub lic de lib era tion, and what kind of rea sons may we 
use in this proc ess: in or der to an swer these ques tions, I point to a ge neric nor ma-
tive-theo reti cal struc ture of such ac counts.
In the sec ond part, I will for mu late what I con sider to be the most sig nifi cant 
ave nues for criti cism and evalua tion; the task of se lect ing from the mul ti tude of 
im por tant chal lenges is dif fi cult, yet I chose to re fer to a se ries of broad ap proaches 
that can qual ify as sys tem atic. Some of these chal lenges are ”em piri cal”: they con-
cern, in other words, the de gree of fea si bil ity of some of the nor ma tive am bi tions 
of de lib era tive de moc ratic ac counts. As long as many re cent de vel op ments in the 
lit era ture are aim ing pre cisely to ad dress the cur rent co nun drums of de moc ratic 
so cie ties, with their cri ses of rep re sen ta tion, par tici pa tion etc., the ques tions of 
costs and fea si bil ity are le giti mate and help ful.
Yet the more rele vant kind of chal lenges, which I pre fer to de scribe and as-
sess more ex ten sively in this es say, re fer to the ana lyti cal co her ence and nor ma-
tive worth of the theo reti cal state ments that form the core of de lib era tive 
de moc ratic po liti cal the ory. I se lected sev eral types of criti cal ap proaches that 
could of fer, I con tend, sig nifi cant re sources for fu ture nor ma tive re vi tali za tion. 
En gag ing these pow er ful criti cal as sess ments should give de lib era tive de moc rats 
(and po liti cal theo rists in gen eral) the op por tu nity to re new their nor ma tive and 
ana lyti cal tools. I list and as sess, then, what I con sider to be the main ”cases 
against de lib era tive de moc racy”, aside from the ques tions raised by the em piri-
cal lit era ture.
In a way, these are all chal lenges that try to ques tion pre cisely the de moc ratic 
cre den tials of pub lic de lib era tory ac counts: they high light the prob lems of ex clu-
sion, the in ade quate un der stand ing of po liti cal par tici pa tion, rep re sen ta tion, and 
de lib era tion, as well as of the sig nifi cance of vot ing it self. First, I dis cuss the ”case 
from ago nism”, the cri tique de vel oped by Chan tal Mouffe, Bon nie Honig and oth-
ers against what they per ceive as the over-mor al iz ing, con sen sus-ori ented con-
cep tion of po liti cal ac tion that char ac ter izes, in their view, pub lic de lib era tory 
ac counts. And sec ond, I bring to fore the ”case from rheto ric”: au thors such as 
Bryan Gar sten and Gary Remer have ques tioned, from sepa rate di rec tions, the 
sharp con trast – cen tral in con tem po rary ac counts of de lib era tive de moc racy – be-
tween pub lic, ra tional de lib era tion and rhe tori cal per sua sion. They ana lyze the 
mag ni tude of this sepa ra tion and its con tem po rary sig nifi cance, and by pro pos-
ing that we re con sider the place of rheto ric in nor ma tive po liti cal the ory and con-
tem po rary poli tics, they in ef fect high light a se ri ous po ten tial op por tu nity for 
re as sess ing the domi nant view on the re sources of nor ma tiv ity and the na ture of 
po liti cal ac tion.
Sev eral of these criti cal ap proaches share among them vari ous quali fi ca tions 
and di ag nos tics of de lib era tive de moc racy, yet clas si fy ing them in these three 
rather dis tinct cate go ries is both ana lyti cally war ranted and theo reti cally rele vant. 
One fi nal in tro duc tory note: I use the terms de lib era tive de moc racy, de moc ratic de-
lib era tion and pub lic de lib era tion mostly in ter changea bly; vari ous au thors as cribe 
dif fer ent mean ings among these no tions, yet some of these de bates go be yond the 
pur poses of this ar ti cle.
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WHAT IS DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?
”[W]e can de fine de lib era tive de moc racy as a form of gov ern ment in 
which free and equal citi zens (and their rep re sen ta tives), jus tify de ci sions in 
a proc ess in which they give one an other rea sons that are mu tu ally ac cept able 
and gen er ally ac ces si ble, with the aim of reach ing con clu sions that are bind ing 
in the pre sent on all citi zens but open to chal lenge in the fu ture.”1
De lib era tive de moc rats con struct their theo ries as an swers to the chal lenge of 
de fin ing cri te ria for le giti mate de ci sion-mak ing in face of wide spread so cial ”rea-
son able” dis agree ment among autono mous citi zens. As theo ries of po liti cal jus ti fi-
ca tion, there fore, de lib era tive de moc ratic ac counts aim to spec ify the re quire ments 
that de ci sion-mak ing proc esses have to ful fill in or der to qual ify as le giti mate and 
de moc ratic2. Since con tem po rary so cie ties are char ac ter ized by moral, po liti cal plu-
ral ism, the task of the po liti cal theo rist is, ac cord ing to these au thors, to for mu late 
the con di tion in which re spect for po liti cal di ver sity is com bined with find ing the 
fair terms of co op era tion, with set ting up a shared ba sis for jus ti fy ing po liti cal de ci-
sions. And, con trary to what they have per ceived as rep re sent ing the domi nant ap-
proach, within po liti cal sci ence, on de fin ing the nor ma tive cri te ria for de moc ratic 
de ci sion-mak ing, de lib era tive de moc rats mainly point to the need for citi zens to of-
fer (and lis ten to) rea sons be fore en gag ing in col lec tive de ci sion-mak ing.
Pub lic de bate with free, equal and fair ac cess should thus pre cede ac tual vot ing. 
In such con ver sa tions citi zens are sup posed to for mu late rea sons for their pref er-
ences, and to as sess the ar gu ments put for ward by the other par tici pants. De lib era-
tive de moc racy, then, takes se ri ously the rea sons that in di vidu als have for their 
pref er ences, in stead of just tak ing these pref er ences as given. More over, since pub lic 
rea son ing is dif fer ent from bar gain ing and in ter est-based un der stand ing of poli tics, 
this means that one of its cen tral ten ets is the claim that some rea sons are ex cluded as 
long as they do not met a num ber of cri te ria re lated to their pub lic char ac ter: pub lic-
ity, ac ces si bil ity and re cip roc ity – a set of con di tions that will be de tailed be low.
De lib era tion vs. Ag gre ga tion of Pref er ences
One of the shared self-de scrip tions among de lib era tive de moc rats points to 
the con trast be tween de lib era tive con cep tions of de moc racy and what they iden-
tify as ”ag gre ga tive” con cep tions of de moc racy. Ever since de lib era tive de moc-
racy en tered main stream po liti cal theo riz ing3, this di chot omy has con sti tuted one 
of the pre ferred ways to de scribe and ex plain the speci fic ity of pub lic de lib era tory 
1 Amy GUTMANN, Dennis THOMPSON, Why Deliberative Democracy, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2004, p. 7.
2 Joshua COHEN, ”Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy”, in James BOHMAN, William 
REHG (eds.), Deliberative Democracy…cit, pp. 67-93.
3 Benjamin BARBER, Strong Democracy: Participatory Democracy for a New Age, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1984; Seyla BENHABIB (ed.), Democracy and Difference, Contesting the 
Boundaries of the Political, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996.
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ac counts. The di chot omy re fers to a fun da men tal, con sti tu tive nor ma tive choice, 
one that in forms the sub se quent po si tions and theo reti cal de vel op ments.
Ag gre ga tion re fers to a se ries of meth ods con ven tion ally used in po liti cal sci-
ence to con nect a given set of pref er ence to a col lec tive choice. In one of the oft-cited 
es says on this dis tinc tion, Jon El ster char ac ter izes so cial choice theo ries as fol lows:
”(1) We be gin with a given set of agents, so that the is sue of a nor ma tive 
jus ti fi ca tion of po liti cal bounda ries does not arise. (2) We as sume that the agents 
con front a given set of al ter na tives, so that for in stance the is sue of agenda ma-
nipu la tion does not arise. (3) The agents are sup posed to be en dowed with 
pref er ences that are simi larly given and not sub ject to change in the course of 
the po liti cal proc ess. They are, more over, as sumed to be caus ally in de pend ent 
of the set of al ter na tives. (4) In the stan dard ver sion, which is so far the only 
op era tional ver sion of the the ory, pref er ences are as sumed to be purely or di-
nal, so that it is not pos si ble for an in di vid ual to ex press the in ten sity of his 
pref er ences, nor for an out side ob server to com pare pref er ence in ten si ties 
across in di vidu als. (5) The in di vid ual pref er ences are as sumed to be de fined 
over all pairs of in di vidu als, i.e. to be com plete, and to have the for mal prop erty 
of tran si tiv ity, so that pref er ence for A over B and for B over C im plies pref er-
ence for A over C. Given this set ting, the task of so cial choice the ory is to ar-
rive at a so cial pref er ence or der ing of the al ter na tives”1.
This view, ac cord ing to El ster, has been ex ten sively ques tioned by im pos si bil-
ity theo rems; yet even if such chal lenges could, in cer tain con di tions, be miti gated, 
there is an other, more im por tant kind of criti cism put for ward by de lib era tive de moc-
rats. This is the charge that so cial choice theo ries of de moc racy as simi late citi zens 
with con sum ers, and the act of vot ing with the act of pur chas ing. The sov er eignty of 
the con sumer in the mar ket place is con founded with the sov er eignty of citi zenry 
in a de moc ratic po liti cal com mu nity. This is the main con fu sion that theo ries of de-
lib era tive de moc racy pro pose to elimi nate, by pos it ing the dis tinct nor ma tive con-
text in which col lec tive de ci sions are made in a de moc racy.
Again, in face of moral and po liti cal con flict, of the ”rea son able plu ral ism” 
among con cep tions held by autono mous in di vidu als as citi zens, col lec tive de ci-
sions should fol low and be based on rea soned de lib era tions in which citi zens en-
gage as free and equals. As such, they would be placed in a re la tion to each other 
that is simi lar not to the mar ket place, but rather to the ”fo rum”. Mir ror ing El ster’s di-
chot omy be tween the mar ket and the fo rum, Haber mas had in tro duced a con trast be-
tween ”com mu ni ca tive” and ”stra te gic” ac tion2, which again aims to em pha size the 
role of ar gu ment and rea soned con ver sa tion which need to dis place power, bias 
and in ter ests, as ba sis of le giti mate po liti cal de ci sions.
The task of po liti cal phi loso phy, in this view, is not (only) that of con ceiv ing 
the most ef fi cient way of ag gre gat ing a given set of pref er ences; ques tions of jus tice 
and le giti macy af fect the na ture of those pref er ences them selves, as well as col lec-
tive de ci sions, in such a way that these pref er ences can not be con sid ered ”pre-po-
liti cal”, that is, as given. Those in di vid ual pref er ences need to un dergo a proc ess 
1 Jon ELSTER, ”The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory”, in James 
BOHMAN, William REHG (eds.), Deliberative Democracy…cit, p. 5.
2 Jürgen HABERMAS, The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols., transl. by Thomas McCarthy, 
Beacon Press, Boston, 1987.
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of jus ti fi ca tion, which means that they need to be for mu lated in terms of rea sons 
that oth ers can ac cept.
The al ter na tive that con sists in a mecha nism of fil ter ing in ade quate pref er ences 
while main tain ing some form of ag gre ga tive de ci sion-mak ing, could still be pos si-
ble, yet ac cord ing to such au thors, it can not be con sid ered as suf fi ciently de moc ratic. 
We could, in other words, imag ine a more aris to cratic set ting in which a se ries of 
agents fil ter popu lar pref er ences in or der to ren der them ac cept able, ra tional, or com-
pati ble, yet such set ting would cer tainly fail most de moc ratic tests to day. De lib era-
tive de moc racy, then, in stead of seek ing to com bine – how ever fairy or ef fi ciently – the 
pref er ences as they hap pen to be ex pressed by citi zens, aims at sub ject ing the rea-
sons for those pref er ences to pub lic scru tiny in an open, de lib era tive con text.
This de lib era tive im pera tive aims to ad dress an other core prob lem for de moc-
ratic thought: the risk of tyr anny of the ma jor ity. In pub lic de lib era tive set tings, col-
lec tive de ci sions are not those based sim ply on what a ma jor ity of citi zens hap pens 
to pre fer. Pub lic opin ion, as long as this open de lib era tory set ting is ab sent, can not 
have se ri ous nor ma tive weight. Again, de lib era tive de moc rats in sist that col lec tive 
de ci sions need to be reached as part of a justi fi ca tory proc ess in which the rea sons 
for those pref er ences are dis cur sively as sessed. The ”rea son-giv ing re quire ment” 
ap plies to ma jori ties as well, how ever large and de ter mi nate they are. In stead of 
the force of num bers, le giti mate de ci sions are reached when they are based on the 
force of the bet ter ar gu ment(s).
Ac cord ing to Gut mann and Thomp son, ”[t]he gen eral aim of de lib era tive de-
moc racy is to pro vide the most jus ti fi able con cep tion for deal ing with moral dis-
agree ment in poli tics”1. Pub lic de lib era tion is, then, a way of le giti miz ing col lec tive 
de moc ratic de ci sion. Sev eral theo rists have en gaged in fur ther elabo rat ing on the 
jus ti fi ca tion of de lib era tion it self. Al ready in the works of John Rawls2, Jür gen 
Haber mas3 or Joshua Cohen4, the idea of de lib era tion is part of a con cep tion of po-
liti cal le giti macy. Citi zens should be un der stood as autono mous agents, or in the 
words of Rawls, ”self-au then ti cat ing sources of valid claims”5. The mean ing of 
pub lic jus ti fi ca tion is pos ited on the re quire ment of citi zens mu tu ally ex plain ing 
and jus ti fy ing each other their po liti cal choices6.
The cir cum stances of pub lic jus ti fi ca tion, which make sense of the core nor ma-
tive ideal at work in de lib era tive de moc racy, are de fined by free, equal, autono-
mous agents and the fact of plu ral ism7. There is a sig nifi cant body of works that 
1 Amy GUTMANN, Dennis THOMPSON, Why Deliberative Democracy, cit, p. 10.
2 John RAWLS, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition, Columbia University Press, New York, 
2005.
3 Jürgen HABERMAS, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996.
4 Joshua COHEN, ”Deliberation…cit.”. 
5 John RAWLS, Erin KELLY, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 2nd edition, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001, p. 27.
6 ”In a well-ordered society effectively regulated by a publicly recognized political conception 
of justice, everyone accepts the same principles of justice. These principles provide, then, a mutual-
ly acceptable point of view from which citizens’ claims on the main institutions of the basic structure 
can be adjudicated. An essential feature of a well-ordered society is that its public conception of po-
litical justice establishes a shared basis for citizens to justify to one another their political judgments: 
each cooperates, politically and socially, with the rest on terms that all can endorse as just. This is the 
meaning of public justification”, in John RAWLS, Erin KELLY, Justice as Fairness...cit, p. 23.
7 ”So understood, justification is addressed to others who disagree with us […] If there is no 
conflict in judgment about questions of political justice – judgments about the justice of certain prin-
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set out to de velop the con cep tual and nor ma tive con nec tions be tween the main 
val ues at stake in the lit era ture on pub lic de lib era tion and jus ti fi ca tion – ques tions 
of auton omy, equal ity and free dom, rea son and di ver sity, among oth ers, – and 
which can not be treated ade quately in this es say. They point how ever to dif fer ent 
ways of con ceiv ing the na ture and es pe cially the jus ti fi ca tion of de lib era tive de-
moc racy. Some of these de bates re volve around the ques tion of whether pub lic de-
lib era tion em bod ies sub stan tive val ues or cor re sponds rather to pro ce dural 
re quire ments; oth ers are con cerned with whether it has in stru men tal or in trin sic 
value in con tem po rary de moc ra cies. Oth ers yet, make con cep tual in roads in de fin-
ing and test ing the epis temic vir tue of pub lic de lib era tory set tings and of the de ci-
sions reached in de lib era tive de moc racy1.
Pub lic Rea sons
The rea sons that citi zens are re quired to pro duce – and en ti tled to lis ten from 
oth ers – should be, first and fore most, pub lic. This means that citi zens should ad-
vance only those rea sons that could be ac cepted by oth ers, as ”free and equal per-
sons seek ing fair terms of co op era tion”2. In an other for mu la tion, only those rea sons 
that oth ers (free and equal per sons try ing to find fair terms of co op era tion) could 
not rea sona bly re ject, can be con sid ered pub lic.
The re quire ment that oth ers be able to ac cept the rea sons we put for ward for our 
pref er ences is, thus, a core fea ture of de lib era tive de moc ratic theo ries. It is in this sense 
that pub lic ra tional de lib era tion be comes dif fer ent than mere bar gain ing or threats; in 
pub lic de lib era tion in di vidu als can not press their own case by dis re gard ing the oth-
ers, nor by us ing their heav ier bar gain ing power in or der to im pose their pref er ences. 
Rea son-giv ing in this sense ex cludes those pref er ences that are only ”self ish” and can-
not be ex pressed with at least some con sid era tion for the com mon good3.
A sec ond sense in which rea sons are pub lic re fers to their ac ces si bil ity. There 
are at least three ways in which de lib era tive de moc rats in sist that rea sons ad vanced 
by citi zens be ac ces si ble. Prin ci pally in the re cent po liti cal con text of re li gious dis-
putes, a se ri ous weight has been at tached pre cisely to the role of re li gious ar gu-
ments in pub lic de bates. Rea sons for pref er ences that ap peal to re vealed truth, in this 
per spec tive, are not ac ces si ble to oth ers, and there fore can not meet the pub lic ity 
test. For John Rawls, more over, such ap peals are prob lem atic not just be cause they 
ciples and standards, particular institutions and policies, and the like – there is nothing so far to jus-
tify. To justify our political judgments to others is to convince them by public reason, that is, by ways 
of reasoning and inference appropriate to fundamental political question, by appealing to beliefs, 
grounds, and political values it is reasonable for others also to acknowledge. Public justification pro-
ceeds from some consensus: from premises all parties in disagreement, assumed to be free and 
equal and fully capable of reason, may reasonably be expected to share and freely endorse”, Ibidem.
1 Joshua COHEN, ”An Epistemic Conception of Democracy”, Ethics, vol. 97, no. 1, 1986, 
pp. 26-38.
2 Amy GUTMANN, Dennis THOMPSON, Why Deliberative Democracy, cit, p. 3.
3 This consideration for the common good has attracted many of the contemporary advo-
cates of neorepublicanism, who endorse some form of deliberation in collective decision-making. 
See Philip PETTIT, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1997, and Richard DAGGER, Civic Virtues. Rights, Citizenship and Republican Liberalism, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.
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hin der pub lic de lib era tion, but be cause they are a la tent source of con flict and dis rup-
tion: the dan ger is that of an ir re duci ble ”clash be tween Sal va tion ist, creedal and ex-
pan sion ist re lig ions”1, with their claims grounded on mu tu ally un avail able rea sons. 
In other words, the cir cum stances of plu ral ism are, for theo rists of pub lic de lib era tion 
such as Rawls, still those of the Ref or ma tion era: the po ten tial for po liti cal vio lence is 
main tained by the con tin ued rele vance in con tem po rary de moc ratic so cie ties of re li-
gious views in which sal va tion takes prece dence over other po liti cal val ues.
An other sense in which the re quire ment of ac ces si bil ity be comes cru cial is re-
vealed by the con texts in which col lec tive de ci sions are taken in ab sence of rele vant 
in for ma tion. Se crecy is the op po site of open, rea soned con ver sa tion that is the sub-
stance of pub lic de lib era tion. When ever de lib era tion is hin dered by se crecy, and in 
as much as some par tici pants to the de bate are able in voke knowl edge of se cret 
data, the rea sons they ad vance are not avail able to oth ers, and hence not pub lic.
The prob lem atic of se crecy is re lated, but dis tinct from that of ex per tise. The 
na ture and role of ex per tise in con tem po rary de moc ra cies are not the same with 
those of se crecy: not only are the con ven tional ave nues for the pro duc tion of sci en-
tific ex per tise in creas ingly chal lenged2 from ac tiv ists and al ter na tive sources of 
claims; but even within aca demic and ex perts’ com mu ni ties, peer-re views, meth-
odo logi cal checks and dis ci pli nary bounda ries pro vide some meas ure of trans par-
ency. There still is a ”prob lem with ex perts”3 from the per spec tive of de moc ratic 
the ory, but its na ture is con cep tu ally dif fer ent. Se crecy, then, en tails a dif fer ent 
kind of non-ac ces si bil ity than sci en tific ex per tise4.
De lib era tive de moc rats also in sist that pub lic rea sons are in com pati ble with 
the use of rheto ric. This is an as pect that will be taken up in the sec ond part of this 
es say, since this con sti tutes, in my opin ion, an im por tant po ten tial ave nue for con-
cep tual and nor ma tive in no va tion. By choos ing a ra tion al is tic and – many have ar-
gued – over-mor al iz ing defi ni tion of pub lic rea son as the only ade quate dis cur sive 
means to wards po liti cal jus ti fi ca tion, de lib era tive de moc rats have, im plic itly or ex-
plic itly, re-en acted one of the old est, clas si cal di choto mies in po liti cal phi loso phy: 
that be tween phi loso phy and rheto ric. Ob tain ing pub lic rea sons and some form of 
ra tional con sen sus by ex clud ing any rhe tori cal ele ments from po liti cal dis course 
con sti tutes an im por tant part of de lib era tive de moc rats’ nor ma tive ideal, but at 
the same time, it has been ar gued, the sign of a prob lem atic, skewed con cep tu ali za-
tion of the po liti cal.
Fi nally, Den nis Thomp son and Amy Gut mann add two other fea tures to the 
char ac teri za tion of pub lic rea sons. On the one hand, they should be con ceived as ”dy-
namic”. Dy namic de lib era tion makes pos si ble de ci sions even when con ver sa tion 
1 John RAWLS, Political Liberalism, cit., 2005, p. xxv.
2 Michael GIBBONS, Camille LIMOGES, Helga NOWOTNY, Simon SCHWARTZMAN, 
Peter SCOTT, Martin TROW, The New Production of Knowledge, Sage Publications, London, 1994.
3 Stephen TURNER, ”What is the Problem with Experts?”, Social Studies of Science, vol. 3, no. 1, 
2001, pp. 123-149.
4 To imagine an example, let’s suppose the government of a country decides to wage war 
with another country, or to restrict citizens’ liberties, while invoking knowledge of information 
that cannot be made public. This is not expertise that could be assessed and challenged by any-
one with a degree in, say international relations or quantum mechanics. What such governments 
would claim is not that their reasons are complex and accessible only to individuals who have al-
ready undergone a serious formation in the scientific disciplines in question, but rather, that their 
reasons are based on exclusive information which cannot be shared with anyone.
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did not reached a con clu sive end; such pro vi sional meas ures al low po liti cal ac tion 
while de lib era tion con tin ues and up dates with the con texts. In clud ing the ref er-
ence to this dy namic char ac ter al lows Gut mann and Thomp son to an swer to the 
com mon ob jec tions point ing to the time-con sum ing and para lyz ing ef fect pub lic 
de lib era tion could have on po liti cal ac tion.
On the other hand, Gut mann and Thomp son add to the de lib era tive con text 
the rec om men da tion of an ”econ omy of moral dis agree ment”. As a di men sion of 
mu tual re spect, when citi zens de lib er ate, they should re frain from mul ti ply ing the 
in stances of dis cord; un der con di tions of re cip roc ity, they should avoid in vok ing 
fur ther val ues which are in con flict. This econ omy of dis agree ment al lows then 
citi zens to con tinue to co op er ate and en gage in dy namic de lib era tion, with out be-
ing blocked by other lev els of con flict.
Fo rums of De lib era tion
Where should de lib era tion take place? When is it nec es sary to frame our con-
tri bu tions to de bates in terms of pub lic rea sons? From the di verse an swers de lib-
era tive de moc rats sug gest to these ques tions, we can dis tin guish at least two 
broad ori en ta tions: de lib era tions should be wide spread and con cern a large num-
ber of is sues; or, they should be lim ited to cer tain fun da men tal is sues and within 
pre cise in sti tu tional con fines. The first an swer is adopted by au thors such as Ben-
habib or Gut mann and Thomp son, in spired by Haber mas, while the sec ond is sug-
gested by John Rawls.
Ac cord ing to Seyla Ben habib, ”[t]he ar gu ment that there may be an in visi ble 
limit to the size of a de lib era tive body that, when crossed, af fects the na ture of the 
rea son ing proc ess is un doubt edly true”. Yet the theo rists of de lib era tive de moc racy 
do not need, af ter all, to in voke the fic tion of a gen eral as sem bly of de lib er at ing citi-
zens. The way they con ceive their pro ce dural ist model of de lib era tive de moc racy 
al lows them to imag ine
“a plu ral ity of modes of as so cia tion in which all af fected can have the right to 
ar ticu late their point of view. These can range from po liti cal par ties, to citi zens’ 
ini tia tives, to so cial move ments, to vol un tary as so cia tions, to con scious ness-rais-
ing groups, and the like. It is through the in ter lock ing net of these mul ti ple 
forms of as so cia tion, net works, and or gani za tions that an anony mous ’pub lic 
con ver sa tion’ re sults. It is cen tral to the model of de lib era tive de moc racy that 
it privi leges such a pub lic sphere of mu tu ally in ter lock ing and over lap ping 
net works and as so cia tions of de lib era tion, con tes ta tion and ar gu men ta tion”1.
Simi larly, Gut mann and Thomp son main tain that the op por tu nity for de lib-
era tion should not be re stricted to ”con sti tu tional con ven tions, Su preme Court 
opin ions, or their theo reti cal ana logues”; rather, they should ex tend to what they 
call ”mid dle de moc racy”:
”It should ex tend through out the po liti cal proc ess – to what we call the 
land of mid dle de moc racy. The fo rums of de lib era tion in mid dle de moc racy 
1 Seyla BENHABIB, ”Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy”, in IDEM (ed.), 
Democracy and Difference…cit, p. 75.
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em brace vir tu ally any set ting in which citi zens come to gether on a regu lar ba sis 
to reach col lec tive de ci sions about pub lic is sues – gov ern men tal as well as non-
gov ern men tal in sti tu tions. They in clude not only leg is la tive ses sions, court pro-
ceed ings, and ad min is tra tive hear ings at all lev els of gov ern ment but also 
meet ings of grass roots or gani za tions, pro fes sional as so cia tions, share hold ers 
meet ings, and citi zens’ com mit tees in hos pi tals and other simi lar in sti tu tions”1.
Po liti cal lib er al ism, as de vel oped by John Rawls, also de fines le giti macy as a 
con cept whose con tent de pends on the man ner in which we con struct a pro ce dure 
of ra tional de lib era tion and ar gu men ta tion. But where else could these pub lic de-
lib era tions take place, be yond this ab stract level? For Rawls, the use of pub lic rea-
son in de lib era tion is dou bly re stricted: on the one hand, the ob ject of de lib era tion 
is lim ited to what he names as ”con sti tu tional es sen tials” and ques tions of ba sic 
jus tice, while, on the other hand, the privi leged place where such de lib era tions 
should take place is not nec es sar ily the so ci ety at large and its many as so cia tions, 
par ties and groups; rather, this fo rum is the U.S. Su preme Court. Ac cord ing to 
John Rawls, pub lic rea son should guide the de lib era tions of the mem bers of the 
con sti tu tional courts, as well as of those placed in a po si tion to for mu late and in ter-
pret the ul ti mate po liti cal prin ci ples of a po liti cal com mu nity. Hence, the level at 
which these de lib era tions ought to (and could) take place is one where de ci sions 
con cern those fun da men tal po liti cal ar range ments, val ues and rights that de ter-
mine the po liti cal iden tity of a na tion. In ”The Idea of Pub lic Rea son Re vis ited”, 
Rawls ex tends this un der stand ing of po liti cal de lib era tion, and states that
”the ideal of pub lic rea son […] is re al ized, or sat is fied, when ever judges, leg is la-
tors, chief ex ecu tives, and other gov ern ment of fi cials, as well as can di dates for 
pub lic of fice, act from and fol low the idea of pub lic rea son and ex plain to other 
citi zens their rea sons for sup port ing fun da men tal po liti cal po si tions in terms 
of the po liti cal con cep tion of jus tice they re gard as the most rea son able”2.
PUBLIC DELIBERATION, BETWEEN INCLUSION AND POWER
One way to un der stand the con tem po rary nor ma tive sig nifi cance of de lib era-
tive de moc racy is to view it as part of an on go ing proc ess in which Jür gen Haber-
mas’s origi nal con cept of pub lic sphere is trans formed. But how de moc ratic really 
is de lib era tive de moc racy? The main ar gu ments pro posed by crit ics of de lib era-
tive de moc racy re volve around two ways of un der stand ing that ques tion. One 
way is to point to the ex clu sion ary ef fects of the re quire ments for pub lic de lib era-
tion. A sec ond way is to ex plain it by high light ing a per ceived in ca pac ity of mod-
ern theo rists of de lib era tive de moc racy to un der stand the core po liti cal na ture of 
de moc ratic life. In other words, in the first cri tique, the cri te ria and stan dards of 
pub lic de lib era tion are shown to act as con cep tual and nor ma tive bar ri ers to po liti cal 
par tici pa tion, counter-in cen tives and ex clu sion ary mecha nisms. The sec ond cri tique 
con tin ues this charge by in sert ing it in a lar ger ac count of the state of con tem po rary 
1 Amy GUTMANN, Dennis THOMPSON, Democracy and Disagreement, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996, pp. 12-13.
2 John RAWLS, ”The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University Of Chicago Law Review, 
vol. 64, no. 3, 1997, pp. 765-766.
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po liti cal the ory, in which crit ics de cry the mis guided ef forts of Haber mas and oth-
ers in their at tempt to ”elimi nate power”, over em pha size rea son and over-mor al-
ize poli tics.
Many ad vo cates of pub lic de lib era tion have in deed seemed to over look the 
ten sion that ex ists be tween achiev ing wider po liti cal par tici pa tion and im pos ing 
more de mand ing cri te ria for ad mit ting citi zens’ ar gu ments in the justi fi ca tory proc-
ess. These criti cal re ac tions con test ing the de moc ratic cre den tials of pub lic de lib era-
tion can be summed up in the fol low ing way: de lib era tive de moc rats’ ac counts 
”can’t have it all”1: po liti cal par tici pa tion, pub lic rea son, de moc ratic in clu sion, im-
par ti al ity, mo ti va tion, and epis temic vali da tion. The in evi ta ble trade-offs be tween 
the val ues of de moc ratic poli tics should be not only made more ex plicit, but ac tu-
ally ac knowl edged: pro po nents of de lib era tive de moc racy seem, in deed, to dis re-
gard the se ri ous ness of the con cep tual in com pati bili ties that their theo reti cal 
con struc tions face.
On the im por tance of tak ing citi zens’ mo ti va tion for po liti cal par tici pa tion se ri-
ously, the pro ce dural ist key in which this prob lem is ap proached in de lib era tive de-
moc ratic thought is il lus tra tive. Ac cord ing to Haber mas, for in stance, a test 
re gard ing mo ti va tion is al ready built into the de lib era tive-justi fi ca tory pro ce dure: 
citi zens who con sider them selves un able to sup port a par ticu lar norm can sim ply 
re ject that norm in the de lib era tion proc ess. Yet, such an an swer seems to mis un der-
stand the bar rier that de lib era tive pro ce dural ism it self erects against tak ing mo ti va-
tion se ri ously: lack of mo ti va tion could sim ply be as simi lated to per sonal bias and 
hence ex cluded from ac cept able rea sons. But more im por tantly, Haber mas’s pro ce-
dural so lu tion may ad dress the prob lem of keep ing citi zens who are al ready en-
gaged in the de lib era tive proc ess, moti va tion ally in volved. Yet it does noth ing to 
ex plain how and why would citi zens adopt and par tici pate to such re stric tive de-
lib era tive pro ce dures in the first place.
“What is really at stake in the cri tique of ’de lib era tive de moc racy’”, ac cord ing 
to Chan tal Mouffe, ”is the need to ac knowl edge the di men sion of power and an-
tago nism and their in eradi ca ble char ac ter”2. By adopt ing and elabo rat ing on the 
Haber ma sian no tion of ”pub lic sphere”, de lib era tive de moc rats have per petu ated 
the con vic tion that a ra tional con sen sus can be achieved, whereby power and an-
tago nism are purged. By do ing that, theo ries of de lib era tive de moc racy deny ”the 
cen tral role in poli tics of the con flict ual di men sion and its cru cial role in the for ma-
tion of col lec tive iden ti ties”. In this sense, these theo ries are fun da men tally ”un able 
to pro vide an ade quate model for de moc ratic poli tics”3.
One way in which this an tago nism is mis un der stood in pub lic de lib era tory theo-
ries is pre cisely through their in com plete, be cause too op ti mis tic, defi ni tion of plu ral-
ism. Pro po nents of the ”ago nis tic” view of de moc racy aim there fore to in tro duce a 
”deeper” di ver sity as con sti tut ing the struc tural fea ture of con tem po rary so cie ties.
The rea son plu ral ism is in ade quately theo rized in theo ries of de lib era tive de-
moc racy is that they must show that citi zens that jus tify to each other the main 
norms of a po liti cal com mu nity, do so by cor rect ing, or fil ter ing out the per sonal 
1 Gerald GAUS, ”Reason, Justification, and Consensus: Why Democracy Can’t Have It All”, 
in James BOHMAN, William REHG (eds), Deliberative Democracy…cit, pp. 205-242.
2 Chantal MOUFFE, ”Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?”, Social Research, vol. 66, 
no. 3, 1999, p. 752.
3 Ibidem.
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bias, un equal power and ego ism that the ag gre ga tive, in ter est-based ac counts of 
de moc racy ac cept. By au thor iz ing ap peal only to rea sons that the oth ers, as rea-
son able and equals, can ac cept, they in fact pre sup pose the pos si bil ity of a ra-
tional moral con sen sus.
For their crit ics, the po ten tial for ade quately con cep tu al iz ing po liti cal plu ral-
ism is as a re sult dras ti cally re duced. ”Plu ral ism” be comes ei ther sim ply ”the fact 
of plu ral ism”, or ”rea son able plu ral ism”. The for mer – fact of plu ral ism – in cludes 
all sorts of dis agree ments and po liti cal di ver sity; rea son able plu ral ism re fers how-
ever only to that set of citi zens’ con cep tions that are rea son able, i.e. in clude rea-
sons that are for mu lated in terms that oth ers can ac cept; such citi zens ac cept each 
other as part ners in rea son-giv ing justi fi ca tory pro ce dures and agree to rec og nize 
some ”po liti cal con cep tion of jus tice” or other ba sic ac count of po liti cal prin ci ples 
and fun da men tal in sti tu tions. Ul ti mately, many de lib era tive de moc rats share 
Rawls’s con vic tion that plu ral ism is es sen tially de struc tive and needs to be placed 
un der the firm con trol of pub lic rea son.
While theo rists of po liti cal lib er al ism or de lib era tive de moc racy have to as-
sume that at least at a cer tain level there can be a pre limi nary agree ment on the jus-
ti fi ca tion of sub se quent de lib era tions, au thors such as Bon nie Honig, James Tully 
and Wil liam Con nolly point out the con tra dic tory na ture of this po si tion: in stead of 
be ing a pre con di tion of poli tics, any such agree ment can only be the re sult of poli tics1, 
forged through con tinu ous ne go tia tions and sub ject to power and he gem ony. ”So-
cial ob jec tiv ity”, in the words of Mouffe, ”is con sti tuted through acts of power”.
In a some what simi lar vein, Wendy Brown la ments the mor al iz ing style of 
con tem po rary po liti cal the ory. Writ ing about ”mor al ism as anti-poli tics”2, she dis-
tin guishes be tween mo ral ity, with its ”dis trust” of power, and mor al ism, which 
”loathes” mani fes ta tions of power: the mor al ist ”in evi ta bly feels an tipa thy to-
ward poli tics as a do main of open con tes ta tion for power and he gem ony”, where 
ac tion and agency be come mean ing ful3.
The re quire ments of pub lic rea son ing in de lib era tive de moc racy could 
then amount to what Brown re fers to as be ing ”speech codes” that, in the end, kill 
cri tique. In this sense, they are ul ti mately anti-de moc ratic, since they fore close, 
through the codi fi ca tions and dis cur sive fil ters they im pose, the op por tu ni ties for 
1 See also, Marc STEARS, ”Review Article: Liberalism and the Politics of Compulsion”, 
British Journal of Political Science, vol. 37, no. 3, 2007, pp. 533-553.
2 Wendy BROWN, Politics Out of History, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001.
3 ”[M]oralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by dis-
placing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by config-
uring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech 
rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power. Rather 
than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn 
the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban 
(formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and ges-
ture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quan-
tities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how 
they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed 
to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty, violence against women, and 
other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed. We are lost as 
how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorientation, rather than 
bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good 
fight in our clamor over words and names.” Ibidem, pp. 35-36.
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de moc ratic con tes ta tion. At the end of the day, such mor al iz ing stan dards sti fle 
the very es sence of de moc ratic poli tics:
”[T]urn ing po liti cal ques tions into mor al is tic ones – as speech codes of 
any sort do – not only pro hib its cer tain ques tions and man dates cer tain genu-
flec tions, it also ex presses a pro found hos til ity to ward po liti cal life in so far as 
it seeks to pre empt ar gu ment with a leg is lated and en forced truth”1.
RHETORIC, PERSUASION AND DELIBERATION
In re cent years the re sources of nor ma tiv ity that de lib era tive de moc racy theo-
ries de velop have also been chal lenged from one the most in ter est ing di rec tions of 
re search: I re fer to a cer tain re vival of in ter est in rhe tori cal de lib era tions. As we 
have seen in the first part of this es say, rheto ric has been ex cluded, ei ther ex plic itly 
or im plic itly, by all ma jor theo rists writ ing on pub lic de lib era tion. In their works, 
pub lic ora tory un der stood as sourced in its Greek or Ro man po liti cal con texts, can-
not rep re sent a vi able con text for ra tional, im par tial de lib era tions. Rheto ric is in-
com pati ble with the use of pub lic rea son: in the work of Haber mas, for in stance, it 
is at best an in stance of ”stra te gic” ac tion (hence, nor ma tively me dio cre) and at 
worse, it is as simi lated to a ”pa thol ogy of com mu ni ca tion”.
Like wise, for Seyla Ben habib the ac cep tance of rheto ric in pub lic de lib era tion 
would have the ef fect of ”in duc ing ar bi trari ness” and cre at ing ”ca pri cious ness”:
”It would limit rather than en hance so cial jus tice be cause rheto ric moves 
peo ple and achieves re sults with out hav ing to ren der an ac count of the bases 
upon which it in duces peo ple to en gage in cer tain courses of ac tion rather 
than oth ers […] some moral ideal of im par ti al ity is a regu la tive prin ci ple that 
should gov ern not only our de lib era tions in pub lic but also the ar ticu la tion of 
rea sons by pub lic in sti tu tions. What is con sid ered im par tial has to be in the 
best in ter est of all equally. With out such a nor ma tive prin ci ple, nei ther the 
ideal of the rule of law can be sus tained nor de lib era tive rea son ing to ward a 
com mon good oc cur”2.
Yet a grow ing num ber of au thors have ques tioned and ul ti mately con tested 
the vi abil ity of such a sharp con trast be tween pub lic de lib era tion and rheto ric. Ber-
nard Yack3, Bryan Gar sten4, or Gary Remer5, to name only a few, aim at re ha bili tat-
ing the ana lyti cal worth of rhe tori cal de lib era tions and their nor ma tive cre den tials. 
They start by de cry ing what they per ceive as be ing an in creas ingly nar row and 
1 Ibidem, p. 35.
2 Seyla BENHABIB, ”Toward a Deliberative Model…cit.”, pp. 67-95.
3 Bernard YACK, ”Rhetoric and Public Reasoning. An Aristotelian Understanding of Poli-
tical Deliberation”, Political Theory, vol. 34, no. 4, 2006, pp. 417-438.
4 Bryan GARSTEN, Saving Persuasion. In Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006.
5 Gary REMER, ”Two Models of Deliberation. Oratory and Conversation in Ratifying the 
Constitution”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 8. no. 1, 2000, pp. 68-90 and ”Political Oratory 
and Conversation: Cicero versus Deliberative Democracy”, Political Theory, vol. 27, no. 1, 1999, 
pp. 39-64. See also, Benedetto FONTANA, Garry REMER (eds.), Talking Democracy. Historical 
Perspectives on Rhetoric and Democracy, Penn State Press, Philadelphia, 2004.
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tech ni cal mean ing of ”de lib era tion” in re cent po liti cal the ory: the high moral and 
pro ce dural re quire ments as so ci ated with pub lic rea son seem to ex haust in con tem-
po rary ac counts all the other im por tant senses that de lib era tion could have. Not 
only is con tem po rary po liti cal the ory no to ri ously dis con nected from the work in 
in tel lec tual po liti cal his to ri ans and their pe ri odi cal re as sess ments of the clas si cal 
po liti cal terms and in sti tu tions; but also, by for mally re ject ing or ig nor ing any rele-
vance of rhe tori cal de lib era tion for con tem po rary prac tices and in ter ro ga tions, 
theo rists of de lib era tive de moc racy ap pear to be snub bing an im por tant di men-
sion of our nor ma tive cir cum stances.
In Sav ing Per sua sion, Gar sten re con structs the main mo ments in the his tory of 
po liti cal thought that mark the grad ual, and even tu ally de ci sive sepa ra tion of rheto-
ric from mod ern po liti cal theo riz ing. He goes on to mo bi lize these clas si cal and es-
pe cially mod ern ref er ences in or der to re kin dle in ter est in rheto ric as part of a 
lar ger plea for a ”poli tics of per sua sion”1. Per suad ing citi zens, en gag ing their judg-
ment and open ing ave nues for mo bi li za tion – these are the ad van tages of plac ing 
rheto ric at the core of our un der stand ing of con tem po rary de moc ratic poli tics.
As Brian Gar sten warns, the im po si tion of de mand ing, ra tion al is tic pub lic de-
lib era tion stan dards makes that in di vid ual con tri bu tions rar ify, dog ma tize, and 
radi cal ize, es cap ing, in the end, the con trol and mod er at ing ef fect of po liti cal per-
sua sion, rep re sen ta tion, and me dia tion of de moc ratic in sti tu tions. The ef fect is thus 
one of in di vidu als with draw ing from po liti cal in ter ac tions and be com ing im per me-
able to po liti cal per sua sion. A rhe tori cal per spec tive on plu ral ism at tempts in stead 
to enlarge the ba sis of le giti macy, to free the per sua sive po ten tial of poli tics, and not 
to re duce it to a nar row defi ni tion of ab stract cri te ria of nor ma tive va lid ity.
The di lemma of con tem po rary de moc ra cies can not be re duced, from this per-
spec tive of rheto ric, to the di chot omy pub lic rea son – ir ra tion al ity and vio lence. 
As long as rheto ric’s role is ac cepted as more than chaos or dema gogy, we can re-
turn to a re flec tion on those po liti cal re gimes in which free dom and rheto ric re in-
force each other, and at tempt to re cover the mean ings that those po liti cal theo ries 
which elimi nated rheto ric, have lost.
Ber nard Yack and Gary Remer also draw on clas si cal sources of po liti cal thought 
– Ar is totle and Cicero – in or der to ex tend the range of mean ing ful and le giti mate po-
liti cal de lib era tions. From their per spec tive, con tem po rary ac counts of de lib era tive 
de moc racy look dras ti cally lim ited, and the vari ous pre con di tions that these theo ries 
in sti tute for ac cept able de lib era tion con trib ute to a cer tain nor ma tive pov erty of po-
liti cal the ory to day. Draw ing on Ar is totle’s con cep tion of rhe tori cal de lib era tion, 
Yack points to the way in which these con straints might be come a threat to the so cial 
con di tions that make pub lic rea son ing vi able. ”Norms that limit the kind of ar gu-
ments and proofs that should count in pub lic rea son ing threaten this so cial re la tion-
ship be tween pub lic speak ers and pub lic lis ten ers”, he as serts. This hap pens be cause 
pub lic speak ers find re stricted nu mer ous means and ave nues of per sua sion – hence 
they may ”seek more cov ert or co er cive means of get ting their way”2.
Even more con cern ing, these ”rheto ric-lim it ing norms” im posed by de lib era-
tive de moc racy theo ries, place us in an awk ward dis cur sive po si tion:
”pub lic speak ers will ac cept our judg ments of their ar gu ments and look for 
ways of per suad ing us only when we re ject their ar gu ments in what they deem 
1 Bryan GARSTEN, Saving Persuasion…cit, especially chapter 6. 
2 Bernard YACK, ”Rhetoric and Public Reasoning…cit.”, p. 429.
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a ’rea son able’ man ner, which sug gests that we may have to de fend our re jec tion 
of pub lic speak ers’ pro pos als, rather than sim ply de clare them un per sua sive”1.
Since our re jec tion it self of their ar gu ments must be ”rea son able” and for mu-
lated in terms of pub lic rea sons, this raises the bar for po liti cal de lib era tion and 
par tici pa tion in such a way as to make it prone to con tinu ous mu tual sus pi cion.
For Gary Remer, the main rea sons for which theo rists of de lib era tive de moc-
racy op pose rheto ric is be cause they iden tify it as con trary to ra tional per sua sion; 
”the force of the bet ter ar gu ment”, cen tral tenet of pub lic de lib era tion from Rawls 
and Haber mas to Ben habib and Cohen, is hin dered by the non-ra tional di men sion 
of rhe tori cal per sua sion and its ac cep tance of pas sions and char ac ter. Ul ti mately, 
for de lib era tive de moc rats rheto ric is not just a ”dif fer ent form of talk”2 when com-
pared to de lib era tion (which means that its use, as in the case of bar gain ing, al-
ways has to be au thor ized de lib era tively), but in fact, it tends to be con ceived as a 
form of co er cion.
The per spec tive that theo rists of rhe tori cal de lib era tions ad vance de nies, at its 
core, that the vari ous guises of the re quire ment of pub lic ity in de lib era tion do ac tu-
ally open and make pub lic po liti cal in ter ac tions. Since such re quire ments act as pre-
con di tions to the ac cess to, and mu tual jus ti fi ca tion of po liti cal de ci sions, and they 
mis con ceive the im por tance and le giti macy of al ter na tive con texts of per sua sion. 
Ul ti mately, they un der mine the rhe tori cal cir cum stances of de lib era tion it self.
Part of the dif fi culty of the ac counts pro posed by Gar sten and the other po liti-
cal theo rists of rheto ric, con sists in draw ing up vi able con cep tual bounda ries be-
tween the vari ous uses of rheto ric, i.e. be tween a posi tive, po liti cally ena bling use, 
and a de struc tive di men sion, ef fect of dema gogy. But the merit of this ap proach is 
to of fer an al ter na tive to the type of ana lyti cal con text in which the for mal re quire-
ments and cri te ria of ac cept abil ity of ar gu ments are pre scribed by de lib era tive de-
moc rats. What the tra di tion of rheto ric in spires is a more mo bile, flexi ble, 
com pre hen sive ap proach of the prob lem atic of re duc ing ir ra tion al ity in poli tics.
CONCLUSION
By us ing such a wide con cept of vio lence and purg ing rheto ric from nor mal 
poli tics, and thus by re mov ing it from se ri ous con sid era tions, the theo ries of pub-
lic de lib era tion ap pear un able to pro vide cru cial guid ance as to the nor ma tive dif-
fer ence be tween kinds of po liti cal ar gu ments and their im pli ca tion on in sti tu tions, 
re gimes, and po liti cal trans for ma tion. More over, by im pos ing an asep tic, ster il-
ized me dium of ra tional de lib era tions as the only ac cept able con text for le giti-
macy, de lib era tive de moc rats give, in the end, the im pres sion of pre fer ring to stop 
where poli tics ac tu ally be gins.
As Mi chael Sa ward con tends, the fun da men tal prob lem of de lib era tive de moc-
ratic ac counts re sides in their re for mu la tion of tra di tional le giti macy cri te ria, in 
such a way that de lib era tion it self, and not vot ing, be comes the mark of le giti macy. 
1 Ibidem.
2 Simone CHAMBERS, ”Deliberative Democratic Theory”, Annual Review of Political Science, 
vol. 6, 2003, pp. 307-326
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In other words, rather than de sir able, de lib era tion is the source of po liti cal le giti-
macy for de lib era tive de moc rats. And this raises the co nun drum that such ac-
counts can not, for now, an swer:
”Ul ti mately, can de moc ratic le giti macy ex ist ab sent fair popu lar vot ing 
on the ba sis of uni ver sal adult suf frage, in prin ci ple re gard less of the ex tent to 
which the pref er ences or in ter ests that in form peo ple’s votes are shaped by 
de lib era tive pro ce dures? If de lib era tion ists an swer no – if they give the de-
moc ratic an swer – they un der mine their grand claims about de lib era tion pro-
duc ing le giti macy. If they an swer yes, then pro found ques tions must be 
asked about the de moc ratic cre den tials of ’de lib era tive de moc racy’”1.
1 Michael SAWARD, ”Less Than Meets the Eye. Democratic Legitimacy and Deliberative 
Theory”, in IDEM (ed.), Democratic Innovation. Deliberation, Representation and Association, 
Routledge, London, 2000, p. 69.
